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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      JAMES CONTANT, et al.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
                                               New York, N.Y.
                                               17 Civ. 3139(LGS)
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                 v.
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      BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION,
      et al.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                                November 15, 2018
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                                                10:43 a.m.
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      Before:
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                          HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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           Attorneys for Plaintiffs
      BY: MICHAEL C. DELL'ANGELO
16

    and -

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           Bank of America, N.A. and
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11	000
12	THE COURT: You may be seated.
13	(Speakerphone connection established)
14	THE CLERK: Hi, counsel on the phone, are you there?
15	Hello?
16	(Pause)
17	Hello. Can you hear me now, counsel on the phone?
18	SPEAKERPHONE VOICE: Yes, we can hear you. Thank you.
19	THE CLERK: OK. Great.
20	So we are here in the matter of 17 Civil 3139, and
21	we're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield.
22	Counsel, your appearances are stated on the record.
23	THE COURT: OK. Good morning. We're here really on
24	two separate matters. One is the preliminary approval hearing
25	for the proposed settlement between plaintiffs and the Citi

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defendants, and the other is an initial Rule 16 conference. I would like to take the preliminary approval issue first, but everybody can just stay where they are.

And through Mr. Ruffino --

MR. RUFFINO: I am counsel for Citibank.

THE COURT: So I will focus on this triangle for the first part of our conference.

So I have reviewed the motion papers. Let me hear from the plaintiffs.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. Could you speak into the mic?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Yes.

Good morning, your Honor. Michael Dell'Angelo, from the law firm of Berger Montague, on behalf of the plaintiffs.

We're pleased to present to you today a motion for preliminary approval of a settlement between the plaintiffs and the Citi defendants. As we've outlined in our papers at docket 155, we believe that the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate and satisfies both the <u>Grinnell</u> factors and the Rule 23 factors.

A brief overview for your Honor is that the settlement was reached while the initial motion to dismiss in this case was pending. There was considerable uncertainty about the direction of the case. After very extensive negotiations with

Citi, the parties reached a settlement that provides for a \$9.95 million cash payment for the class from which up to \$100,000 can be used for notice and identification of class members as part of the development of a plan of allocation, which is part of the settlement.

At the preliminary approval stage, we've requested to follow the work that we believe needs to be done to identify class members and develop a plan of allocation, which is consistent with what the Court did in the FOREX case and some other courts in this district have done when there are multiple parties and settlements are staggered.

An important element of this settlement is that it also provides for significant cooperation from Citi, including the production of certain documents that Citi produced in the FOREX case as well as transactional data, an attorney proffer, and other cooperation in addition to a process where the parties would meet and confer about the production of transactional data to plaintiffs from Citi Pulse, which is a retail broker that Citi operated.

THE COURT: And how is the identification of the retail dealers being handled?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: So that actually leads into, your Honor --

THE COURT: Let's not go into that. Let's just talk about what the arrangement is between you and Citi.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK. So as I understand the terms and as part of the discussion that we'll have with Citi, but the first component is that Citi will be providing us with transactional data, and that transactional data --

THE COURT: What transactional data?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: The transactional -- the transactions that Citi engaged in with what for purposes of kind of discussion in this case we would call the eligible settlement class members in FOREX. And as we've laid out in the preliminary approval papers as well as the motion for leave to amend the papers that you decided recently, that there is this flow essentially from the defendant banks to the eligible settlement class members to the plaintiffs in this case.

Those, quote, eligible settlement class members include retail brokers. That is the primary corpus of entities with whom our plaintiffs would have transacted. So the transactional data that Citi would be providing to the plaintiffs in this case as part of the settlement would include identification of the retail brokers so that we can then kind of match who the plaintiffs would have transacted with --

THE COURT: And how do you identify who those plaintiffs are?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: So the way we structured the class definition is that to be within the scope of the class in our case, you needed -- it is limited to eight states that we have

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specified in the complaint and the papers, and the individuals in those states needed to have transacted with essentially, for simplification of this discussion, a retail broker --

THE COURT: How do you find them? How do you know who that is?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Who those individuals are? So the retail brokers, the easiest way --

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I am having a very hard time understanding what he is saying.

THE COURT: OK. If you could just pull the mic very close, stand it straight up, and pull it right up to the edge of the table so it is under your chin.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK. If I may come around, your Honor, I think it is stuck on the monitors.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Thank you.

THE COURT: You can also use the podium, if you prefer, but the mic is just the same.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: This is fine for now. If it doesn't work, I will move to the podium.

THE COURT: OK. Is that better.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, it is, your Honor.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK. Thank you.

So as we understand it, the transactional data that the retail broker has would identify the individual or entity

that transacted with the retail broker. And, you know, there is --

THE COURT: So the idea is to get the names of the retail brokers who are essentially the class members in FOREX and then to do third-party discovery and get from them -- or some informal discovery -- in any event, get from them in some fashion who they transacted with during the class period?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Yes, your Honor, and that's certainly one way to do it. Another -- by analogy, another way that it could be done is in the securities context, when you have a 10b-5 case under the PSLRA, for example, typically because the individuals or entities who transact in a particular stock, say for purposes of this discussion, will do so in what's called street name, and then so instead of getting the names of every individual that transacted in a particular security, what courts typically do is require the notice to be sent to the broker and the broker then sends the notice to the individuals with whom it was transacting in street name, that is, their customers. It is another way to approach it. I think there are a couple of options that we have and that we can kind of when we get to the --

THE COURT: That is for a later day.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: When we get to the due process issues, I think we can do a lot of --

THE COURT: So do you have any idea how many class

members there are?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: So we have some very rough estimates, but I think at this stage it is difficult to identify with precision the number of class members. It's certainly — at the very low end, it's in the thousands, but we think it is really more like in the tens or perhaps approaching the hundred—thousand mark. What we know is if, for example, we just look at the CFTC data, we can get a pretty clear picture of the amount of FX funds that were being held by retail brokers on behalf of retail customers, and we can also have gathered some data from those retail brokers about the number of accounts that they have, for example. Now, one individual might have multiple accounts but each account in theory would have a claim. So it certainly put us into what we think are the tens of thousands, but that's as precise as we have been able to get at this stage.

THE COURT: And do you have any idea what the potential exposure is of the defendants with respect to those tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: You mean the total potential liability of the case, your Honor?

So the way we approach that question, understanding the backdrop of the time in which we've reached this settlement was in the very early days, and so what we were really constructing was what we viewed as an ice-breaker settlement,

is we did some research and dealt with some experts trying to understand the scope of the various markets that may fall within the class definition. And it is certainly a subset of the FOREX case, and I think it is a relatively small subset.

THE COURT: Why do you think that?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Well, because the -- based on there is data from a variety of sources that gives some insight into the scope of retail FX transactions relative to the total universe of FX transactions, and so we looked at that data to get a sense of what the relative size of the two is. But then this case is a little unique in that the plaintiffs haled from eight of the 50 states in the United States. Some of them, like California, Illinois, Florida, California are very populous states.

THE COURT: And the settlement is limited to those states.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: So the settlement classes with Citi tracked the settlement classes alleged in the complaint, so it is not nationwide. So --

THE COURT: But when you struck this deal on the number, you didn't know how many states would be potentially in play?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I think we did, your Honor, because

the complaint only alleged classes on behalf of those eight states. So we knew --

THE COURT: At most it would be eight.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: That is correct. And the discussions that we had with Citi, as we've indicated in the papers, took place over a considerable amount of time. And there was a vigorous exchange about, you know, for example, we looked at a variety of ways, you know, what percentage of the U.S. population may be represented by, you know, the residents of those states relative to, you know, other ways of looking at that.

THE COURT: So let me just share my thinking with you.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Sure.

THE COURT: Everything that you have said in the last, I don't know, ten minutes, five minutes, is critical to my consideration of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. In your papers, you didn't say any of that. So reading your papers, and even to some extent listening to you now, I have no idea whether this is fair, reasonable and adequate, and so I can't preliminarily approve a settlement without having some of that information.

And so that means I need to have at least a sense of the size of the universe of these transactions and what they're worth. So, I'm going to deny your motion without prejudice and let you proceed however you would like to figure out what you

need to figure out and you may present it in a -- you can simply renew your motion, if you intend to do that at some point, and file a supplement, and I'm happy to consider it in that way, and you should, I guess, file a new notice of motion just so it appears as a new motion.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Sure.

THE COURT: And we'll go from there.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

So, let's talk now about the case management of the remainder of the case. And I have your submissions, and I appreciate your trying to present in a clear way what the issues are, what the positions of the plaintiffs and defendants are on the issues. Even though this is all logistical and planning, there are many, many, many issues and it felt a little bit like Where's Waldo and I was trying to figure it all out. So what I propose to do is let's walk through the proposed case management plan. I will address the issues that seem to arise obviously there, and then if there are additional issues, you can bring them to my attention.

So it seems to me that the first questions arises on page 2 at the bottom, fact discovery deadline. And it seems everyone agrees that it shall be completed by a date to be

agreed to, but there is no date agreed to. So I think we need a control date. I understand it's difficult at this point to really have much of a good sense of how long it will take, but I think we need a control date and we need to try to aim for that control date.

So, I would like to set that as May 2nd, which is, of course, much longer than I normally contemplate. I know there are a couple of — well, more than a couple of wrinkles here with the DOJ stay, also with the fact that some discovery that is relevant has already taken place in the other case and that it is voluminous, but I will set May 2nd as the date.

So that brings us to the production of documents. And as I understand it, the first question is — and now I'm on page 3 — with respect to the documents that everyone agrees are to be produced, which is I think principally the relevant FOREX documents, as I understand it, the plaintiffs' position is that this information would be producible within 30 days from the entry of a protective order. Is that right?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: That is correct, your Honor.

I would just note that in the agreement that we have with Citi, they were able to -- they agreed to do it within 15 days of the entry of a protective order. Just for your benefit, I would also note that on Tuesday of this week, we -- the plaintiffs prepared a form of protective order that is substantially in the form of the protective order that you

entered in FOREX and circulated that to both Citi and all the nonsettling defendants.

THE COURT: Have you heard back from them?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: We have not.

THE COURT: OK. As I understand it, the defendants would like it to be the later of that date or January 11th as an outside date. Is that right?

MR. SCHWARTZ: That is corrects, your Honor. You know, given the numerous banks that are involved here and, of course, the holidays that are coming up, for some of the banks I think January 11th is a much more realistic timeline for those of us who produce within 30 days. We will obviously endeavor to do that.

I would note there is a slight disagreement for us. We would like to follow the NYPL precedent that your Honor set out where the defendants that are not moving to dismiss under Rule 12 will make the production and the defendants that are moving to dismiss under Rule 12 will hold off until your Honor rules on that motion. My understanding is that just based off of the structure of the various bank groups that are named in the complaint, that means that there will be a production of documents I think from the majority of the defendants and even from some of the bank group defendants where perhaps a parent entity is moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: OK. And what is the plaintiffs' position

on this last issue, the distinction between the moving defendants and the nonmoving defendants?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: So as a practical matter, if the preliminary — or if the protective order is entered, it seems to us, particularly now that the Court has set at least an initial discovery deadline of May, which is relatively short given the volume of documents and work to be done in this case, that the sooner we could get the materials and start working through them, the better that would be in part because there is this issue, which I'm sure the Court will get to, about our participation at depositions and the need to get up to speed to do that effectively.

And I would also just note, your Honor, that I think where we came out on that, even though Citibank has indicated that they could do it in 15 days, I think part of what that 30-day deadline was driven by was when the amended complaint was filed and the process for answering or filing a motion to dismiss. So the absence of one would trigger the fact that the a defendant would be answering.

But from our perspective, if the protective order is entered, which seems to me it should be relatively easy to do with the Court's approval, that the defendants who intend to file a Rule 12 motion should produce them nevertheless, because even if they are out of the case, I think there is a process where at least with respect to some them we would be pursuing

those documents in any event.

THE COURT: OK. So it's hard to take first things first because everything seems to be related. It sounds like chronologically the first thing that needs to happen is the proposed protective order, and plaintiffs have proposed the 22nd, which is Thanksgiving. So let's not use that as the date, but I would like the parties to submit to me a proposed protective order that you all agreed to by let's say the 29th, so that's two weeks from today.

And then in terms of the initial production, what I would like to do is have -- well, so --

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, if it helps? If the Court very quickly enters the protective order, that's probably either very late November or early December. Within 30 days would then put us smack between Christmas and New Year's, which is one of the reasons that we asked for January 11th. We think it is just a little bit of breathing room throughout the holidays, especially with our clients who are outside of the United States.

THE COURT: OK. So what I will do is I will use the January 11th date, but I would like to ask for rolling production so that to the extent you can produce earlier or produce in part earlier, I would ask you to do that.

So I guess that leaves only the question of the defendants who would be moving to dismiss. And do we know who

plans on moving to dismiss?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, certain of the defendants with non-U.S. parent companies are intending to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. I am not positive exactly which of the defendants, but it will be more than one defendant that does that. Currently, I am not aware of any defendant that plans to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but I understand that some people may still be considering whether or not to do that.

THE COURT: OK. So with respect to Rule 12(b)(2) motions, I would like to encourage the parties to talk to the plaintiffs and I would -- I've written a lot about personal jurisdiction in this case over foreign entities, so there is a lot of precedent there and I'm inclined to follow it. So if you would please consider the arguments that these parties are making in light of my prior rulings and act accordingly, it will save us all a lot of hopefully unnecessary motion practice.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I appreciate that, your Honor. And in crafting the proposed amended complaint that was attached to our motion for leave, which you granted, we did take that into consideration, but with the understanding with your comments here today, we will go back and take another look at that and I would be happy to engage with any of the defendants.

THE COURT: Well, my procedure calls for an exchange

of premotion letters. So as soon as we get the amended complaint filed, then there will be an exchange of letters. You will be on notice what the arguments are, and that should facilitate a discussion.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. So that leaves us with a question of whether the moving defendants should have to produce at least the initial production of FOREX material. And I guess it doesn't make -- I don't know whether those defendants, for example, you know, foreign parents have documents from FOREX that would be producible.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So, your Honor, what we did in the NYPL case, if I recall correctly -- if I don't, I apologize -- but your Honor said you are not inclined to order discovery from parties that are moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: And that would be my inclination here as well. I don't normally stay discovery for motions to dismiss. On the other hand, if there is a jurisdictional question -- I also wonder how much of those particular entities produced in FOREX anyway.

MR. SCHWARTZ: So, your Honor, I think that is the relevant question here. Even in the NYPL case, just based off of the productions that were made, for example, we did Barclays

as a bank group. Even though the parent company moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, there was still production of the FOREX documents from the Barclays entity that did not move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. And so in that case the NYPL plaintiffs got effectively the entire FOREX production from Barclays.

I can't say that that is going to be the case for each of the defendants in this particular matter. Some of the defendants were, you know, not named in NYPL, for example. Some of the defendants in the FOREX case made much smaller productions that may have come from the parent company. My understanding is that there will still be millions of documents produced, and they will get the bulk of the productions from the bank groups. But I just don't have the roster of exactly which bank entity is going to be producing exactly what for this in part because I don't think every entity has decided whether or not to join in the motion.

THE COURT: So what I will put in the scheduling order, then, is that defendants who are bringing 12(b)(2) motions will be excused from this production at least until a decision on the motion. Any defendant who brings a 12(b)(6) motion -- and after the opinion that I wrote on leave to amend, I certainly hope that there aren't any such motions, but to the extent there are, I'm not staying discovery for 12(b)(6) motions.

1 MR. SCHWARTZ: Understood. 2 THE COURT: OK. All right. 3 So, actually, why don't you all tell me what the next 4 issue is, then. MR. DELL'ANGELO: Well, I think one of the key 5 issues -- I think there is a lot of agreement here, your Honor. 6 7 I think one of the key issues from our perspective of disagreement is about the timing in which the parties can 8 9 undertake their party discovery. So as understand it, the 10 defendants' position is that they should be allowed to proceed 11 with discovery essentially -- that is, serve discovery requests 12 within 14 days of the entry of the protective order. But the 13 plaintiffs may receive two categories of documents that the 14 defendants have agreed to produce, which are the FOREX documents and certain transactional data which the parties 15 would meet and confer about. We couldn't reach an agreement 16 17 about the timing of the production of the data, so that's one 18 issue. But I think --19 THE COURT: You need to talk about that, though. I'm 20 not in a position to be very helpful. 21 MR. DELL'ANGELO: That is correct, and I'm really just 22 framing that. It's not really an area of disagreement. So in 23 an effort to reach as much consensus --24 THE COURT: Let me just interrupt for a minute. 25 MR. DELL'ANGELO: Yes.

THE COURT: I don't understand why we should wait or impose any deadline before which a request for documents can be served. I mean, it will take you some time to figure out what you want to ask for. Perhaps you've figured it out already. The sooner you get the request out there, the better. Nobody thinks that they're going to be able to produce everything within 30 days anyway. You will have a discussion and negotiation. So I don't see why I should set some arbitrary time before which you can't file or send a request for documents.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I generally share that view, your Honor. I think the issue from our perspective is the structure that the defendants wanted to create was to make, in our view, discovery both a sword and a shield. So their proposal, as I understand it, was the plaintiffs can have the nontransactional documents from FOREX. We'll agree to produce transactional data but we'll meet and confer, no commitment on time. To the extent plaintiffs would like to serve document requests to get any additional discovery, we first have to review all 1.3 million documents —

THE COURT: OK. I don't agree with that.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: That was really --

THE COURT: But I will hear from the defendants.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I guess we have heard your view on that. One of the major issues for us is getting the

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information about who these supposed retail FX dealers are.

THE COURT: Well, you think you are getting it from them but they don't have it, so.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Which is a problem if they want to propose a class action. They certainly have the information as to who their named plaintiffs transacted with, or I hope they They fired a purported expert. They claim in their complaint to understand how this market works. They should have the information about who these retail FX dealers are. What they've asked for from us in terms of the data is for us, first of all, to identify who the class members in the FOREX case are. We can't really do that, your Honor. something that the plaintiffs' counsel in the FOREX case would know, because the way they've determined who those class members are is taking data from us and then taking data from the FOREX class members themselves and figuring it out. they weeded out a lot of entities and they probably included some entities that weren't necessarily readily available from the data.

So, first, we don't know that. And then, second of all, then they wanted it to be incumbent upon us to identify who the retail FX dealers are within that. I mean, normally that would be something that the plaintiffs should do, and from our perspective, we know that your Honor obviously took as true the allegations in the complaint. We don't think the retail FX

dealer market works remotely in the way they have describe it.

And so from our perspective the real key discovery in this case, both for class certification opposition and for a summary judgment motion, is to get third-party discovery from these purported dealers so we can demonstrate to your Honor that in fact the facts as alleged in the complaint aren't correct.

So for us, we at a minimum should be getting from them the names, which they've agreed to do, of the FX dealers with whom the named plaintiffs transacted, but, really, you know, they are the ones who, based on their complaint and based on their experts, should be identifying who these dealers are, and if they do that for us, then we can isolate the data that we —

THE COURT: So let me ask a different question. I understand your point, but they have raised at least what on the face of the complaint looks like a colorable claim and it looks like a colorable class claim. Whether it is or not, I have no idea. But given that, it seems to me that both sides have an obligation to produce documents relevant to the claims and defenses here, but that is limited, of course, by the proportionality rule and just common sense about how do we go about this efficiently.

And I understand your point that simply identifying everybody who you viewed as -- and I mean "you" as the defendants broadly -- viewed as potential settlement class members in FOREX, without knowing exactly where it ended up, is

overbroad for two reasons. One is you don't know what the actual universe is, and, two, it is more than just the retail brokers.

So the question is -- you will know this better than I -- what is the most sensible way collaboratively to figure that out, because I believe both sides have discovery obligations?

MR. SCHWARTZ: So, your Honor, what I would suggest is that the plaintiffs, based on their knowledge of the market, based on their consultation with the experts, based on the work that they're going to do in order to give your Honor a sense of the market and the participants in the market for purposes of the preliminary approval of the Citi settlement, identify for the defendants who they believe these retail FX dealers are, and once they do that, the defendants can then produce the spot data that is relevant to those particular transactions.

THE COURT: But they don't know.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: May I --

THE COURT: Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe they do. Let's hear from them.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: May I interject? Because I think I can help facilitate this a little bit.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I think there may be either a misunderstanding or a presentation of some of the joint

portions of the letter that are not consistent with at least our understanding of the language. So looking at docket 170 on page 1, the first paragraph is a joint statement. The last few lines of that joint statement --

THE COURT: Wait. 170 is the letter?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Go ahead.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I am looking at the first page, the first paragraph identified as "Joint Statement."

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: And at the very -- just because it is a very long sentence, what it essentially says, if you look at the last line, is that defendants will produce transactional data from entities identified by plaintiffs as retail foreign exchange dealers. So I think the notion that we have no idea of who they are or that we have not agreed to identify those whom we know to be retail foreign exchange dealers is not correct. And I think that's the scope of the agreement, and it is in part how we got there because initially what we had said is please tell us who the settlement class members are. We understand from defendants why that is not a feasible request so we crafted this solution. We have a way of identifying what we think constitutes at least most of the universe of those retail FX dealers --

THE COURT: So you know who comprises most of the

universe?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: We do believe that we do, your Honor.

And so I think that we already have an agreement with the defendants on that point, but we will identify --

THE COURT: So what are we arguing about?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I don't know your Honor, to be quite frank.

THE COURT: Maybe nothing.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: I think there is one small area of disagreement, which is -- just to give a little context, we had initially, as I indicated, asked the defendants to identify the settlement class members in FOREX. They explained to us why that wasn't feasible. What we then suggested is if they were to identify the eligible settlement class members, which would just be the universe of entities with whom the defendant transacted in FX during the class period in our case, which --

THE COURT: Is there any way for you to just ask the folks in FOREX who they are?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: We could, but I would expect that the defendants would more readily know who they are, but we can certainly ask the people in FOREX. What we felt we could do, your Honor, was take the universe of retail FX brokers that we know and then take the eligible settlement class members in FX and compare those two lists and just make sure that we're not

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missing any so that we don't -- both sides don't end up with issues where there is an entity that they're interested in getting discovery on and we've sort of completed what we need to do --

THE COURT: Why don't we take this one step at a time.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Sure.

THE COURT: You have a big part of this universe. Let's work with that.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK.

THE COURT: Talk to the plaintiffs' counsel in FOREX.

See if you can reach some understanding about that. And if
there are still issues or cleanup work to be done after that,
you can talk to each other. If you can't reach agreement, then
you can come back to me.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: OK.

THE COURT: OK?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. So, does that take care of the basically document production issue?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I think in general it does, your Honor. I think there will obviously be -- well, not "obviously" but we'll obviously look at their requests and see if we have objections and responses to them and we'll come back to you.

One thing that does appear to be on the horizon --

but, again, we won't know until we see it -- is that they have a request for a much larger set of data than just the data that deals with retail FX dealers, and we'll have some issues with that, but discovery disputes will be handled in the normal process, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. That sounds reasonable.

So I'm now turning to page 4. I'm not going to schedule any expert discovery or dispositive motions at this time.

And with regard to lifting the stay of discovery, obviously what we've been talking about is proceeding with discovery so I will lift the stay.

And then with respect to joint status letters -- I'm in paragraph 13A -- I would like them every 45 days, beginning 45 days from today.

And then I will schedule a conference for May 16th at 11, which is about two weeks after the discovery cutoff I set. And you need to get to me at least two weeks before that any premotion letters or dispositive motions or class certification motions, and we'll set a briefing schedule at that time for any motions that it makes sense to proceed with.

And then with respect to the filing of the amended complaint, it sounds like in paragraph 14 on page 6 you all have agreed to a schedule, so I will adopt that schedule.

So given all that, what else do we need to talk about,

if anything?

MR. SCHWARTZ: So, your Honor, there are two quick issues that I would raise.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I understand your Honor set May 2nd as sort of the control date. I would sort of preview for your Honor in advance that that is in our view an aggressive date given that a lot of the discovery is going to be third-party discovery. Some of the discovery the plaintiffs made for pound will be of deposition deponents who are outside the United States, and of course there is going to be a lot of document production back and forth. I think your Honor understands that. I just wanted to sort of state that on the record as point one.

THE COURT: I do. I also like to move discovery along. Part of the purpose of status letters is to let me know what's happening and to show me that everyone is moving as expeditiously as possible. You are, in essence, making a record in case you need to ask for more time. So the status letters are actually very important to me. And my individual rules also say what goes in the status letters, but you now understand, sir, what my orientation is.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Of course, your Honor.

And the second thing to ask for is the Court now has before it four different FX matters. It has this matter. It

has the NYPL matter. It has the continuing consolidated class action against the Credit Suisse defendants. And I don't know if your Honor saw but --

THE COURT: The Allianz.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, there is the Allianz case that was filed. Defendants are very concerned that if there isn't coordination amongst the plaintiffs' counsel in those cases, that it could subject individuals to potentially multiple depositions, which is not only unfair for those individuals regardless of whether they are party employees or in many cases going to be nonparties at all --

THE COURT: I am sympathetic to that. What can I do to help you?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, your Honor, we talked a little bit in this letter about how the Contant plaintiffs obviously have not participated fully in the FOREX cases going backwards, and so we proposed a standard where, you know, unless they can show prejudice, those deponents could not be deposed again just for this particular action. And we would also --

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt for a second.

As I understood their positions from the letters, they reserved their right, subject to their review of the transcript. So this is premature.

MR. SCHWARTZ: It is a hypothetical, yes.

THE COURT: But I will just tell you that I am

sympathetic to trying to make this -- have it cause as little burden as necessary for the defendants and business people at the defendants consistent with giving the plaintiffs the right to do the discovery they need to do.

So, if you think it would be helpful to have, for example, an order with all four captions on it with my encouraging the parties to coordinate, or ordering the parties to at least confer to coordinate to the extent possible, and if you would like to submit such a proposed order, I would be happy to look at it.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, your Honor. That would be fantastic from the defendants' point of view.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The last thing I would ask your Honor is if we were going to try to move discovery along expeditiously, from our perspective the most important information to get from the plaintiffs in this case is their view of who the retail FX dealers are. It is really very difficult for us to sort of make productive defensive or offensive discovery from our side without those names. And so just as your Honor has set a date certain for us to start our production, we would ask for a date certain for the plaintiffs to give us those names. And if the plaintiffs have those names, it shouldn't be difficult to get something that they can produce very quickly.

THE COURT: I will ask Mr. Dell'Angelo when you would be prepared to produce at least the lion's share of those names?

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Sure. Understanding that next week is a holiday week, I think we probably could send that list over sometime next week, your Honor.

To be quite frank, that joint statement that I identified on page 1 of docket 170 about triggering the defendants' obligation to provide us with the transactional data, we are motivated to get them that information in any event. So, I expect that we should be able to do that next week.

THE COURT: So let me set a date of Wednesday of next week. Does that make sense? Thursday is Thanksgiving.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: That would be fine.

If I may, Judge, just, your Honor, with the understanding that to the extent, you know, as we continue to, you know, consult with experts and do discovery, we may identify additional ones --

THE COURT: Of course.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  DELL'ANGELO: It is a pretty comprehensive list for now.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: The one just other caveat I would add, some of the publicly-available data that we have looked at

that has enabled us to identify those retail FX brokers, some of it only goes back to October of 2010, which would be the middle of the class period. So there will be some additional work, which is one of the reasons why we're asking for the eligible settlement class members, but there will certainly be some additional work either by us or with the defendants to identify any that we may be missing as of this time.

THE COURT: OK. Understood.

All right. I will issue an order. Hopefully, it will reflect what we've talked about today, and we're adjourned.

MR. DELL'ANGELO: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned)